We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that they induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature on proportional representation. For instance, we show that Proportional Approval Voting induces the D'Hondt method and that Monroe's rule induces the largest remainder method. We also consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.
Introduction
The study of preference aggregation mechanisms-in particular, voting rules-is an important part of multiagent systems research [e.g., Conitzer, 2010] . Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in multiwinner elections. In this setting, there is a set of agents who entertain preferences over a set of alternatives. Based on these preferences, the goal is to select a committee, i.e., a (fixedsize) subset of the alternatives. Preferences are usually specified either as rankings, i.e., complete linear orders over the set of all alternatives [e.g., Elkind et al., 2014] , or as approval votes, i.e., yes/no assessments of all the alternatives [e.g., Kilgour et al., 2006] . We are particularly interested in the latter variant, in which each agent can be thought of as specifying a subset of alternatives that are "acceptable" for that agent.
The decision scenario modeled by multiwinner elections-selecting a subset of objects from a potentially much larger pool of available objects-is ubiquitous: picking players to form a sports team, selecting items to display in an online shop, choosing the board of directors of a company, etc. Many of these scenarios are reminiscent of parliamentary elections, a topic that has been studied in great detail by political scientists. In a parliamentary election, the candidates are traditionally organized in political parties and the election determines how many parliamentary seats a party is allocated.
Under so-called proportional representation systems with "closed party lists," a voter is allowed to give her vote to one and only one party. In a sense, this forces the voter to approve all candidates from one party and no candidates from any other party. Counting such ballots, and deciding how many candidates are elected from each list, is an apportionment problem. Any apportionment problem can be seen as a very simple approval voting instance: all voters approve all the candidates from their chosen party, and only those.
The present paper formally establishes and explores this analogy between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems. We show how an apportionment problem can be phrased as an instance of an approval-based multiwinner election, thereby rendering multiwinner rules applicable to the apportionment setting. As a result, every approval-based multiwinner rule induces a method of apportionment. Exploring this link between multiwinner rules and apportionment methods is interesting for at least two reasons. First, observing what kind of apportionment method a given multiwinner rule induces yields new insights into the nature of the rule. Second, every multiwinner rule inducing a given apportionment method can be seen as an extension of the apportionment method to a more general setting where candidates have no party affiliations (or party affiliations are ignored in the election process).
The relevance of the latter perspective is due to the realization that closed-list systems have a number of drawbacks. For instance, it is a known feature of closed-list systems that candidates tend to campaign within their parties (for being placed on a good position on the party list), rather than to campaign for the citizens' votes. Closed-list systems thus favor party discipline, at the potential expense of alienating the political elites from the citizens [e.g., see Colomer, 2011 , André et al., 2015 , Ames, 1995 , Chang, 2005 .
In an attempt to overcome these drawbacks, many countries use "open-list" systems, leaving some flexibility to the voters by allowing them to vote for specific candidates inside the chosen party list. In some (rare) cases, voters are given even more freedom. Under so-called "panachage" systems, sometimes used in Luxembourg and in France, voters can vote for candidates from different parties. And sometimes voters vote directly for the candidates and the outcome of elections does not depend on how candidates are grouped into parties. Such is the case for some elections in Switzerland, were variants of multi-winner approval voting are used in several cantons [see Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2016] . In a recent book, Renwick and Pilet [2016] extensively examine this "trend towards greater personalization," which they see as "one of the key shifts in contemporary politics." They find that this trend "is indeed changing core democratic institutions."
After formally establishing the link between approval-based multiwinner rules and apportionment methods, we consider several multiwinner rules and observe that they induce (and extend) apportionment methods that are well-established in the apportionment literature. For instance, Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) induces the D'Hondt method (aka Jefferson method) and Monroe's rule induces the largest remainder method (aka Hamilton method). We also consider properties of apportionment methods (such as lower quota or the Penrose condition) and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally introduces both the apportionment problem and the multiwinner election setting. Section 3 shows how approval-based multiwinner rules can be employed as apportionment methods, and contains several results related to proportional representation. Section 4 is devoted to non-proportional representation in the form of degressive proportionality and thresholds, and Section 5 concludes.
The Apportionment Problem and Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections
In this section we provide the formal setting for the apportionment problem and for approval-based multiwinner elections. For a natural number t ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, let [t] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , t}.
Apportionment Methods
In the apportionment setting, there is a finite set of voters and a finite set of p parties P 1 , . . . , P p . Every voter votes for exactly one party, and for each i ∈ [p], we let v i denote the number of votes that party P i receives, i.e., the number of voters who voted for P i . The goal is to allocate h (parliamentary) seats among the parties. Formally, an instance of the apportionment problem is given by a tuple (v, h), where v = (v 1 , . . . , v p ) ∈ N p is the vote distribution and h is the number of seats to distribute. We use v + to denote the total number of votes,
Here, x i corresponds to the number of seats allocated to party P i .
In our proofs we often argue about seat distributions that result from a given seat distribution by taking away a single seat from a party and giving it to another party. For a seat distribution x = (x 1 , . . . , x p ) and two parties P i and P j such that x i > 0, let x i j denote the seat distribution
, and x ′ ℓ = x ℓ for all ℓ = i, j.
Divisor Methods
A rich and very well-studied class of apportionment methods is defined via divisor sequences. Divisor methods are often defined in a procedurally different, but mathematically equivalent way [see Balinski and Young, 1982, Proposition 3.3 1 Most apportionment methods allow for ties. In this paper we do not consider any specific tie-breaking rule but rather assume that the apportionment methods might return several tied outcomes.
2 Divisor methods with d(0) = 0 can also be defined. For such methods, which Pukelsheim [2014] calls impervious, the conventions
⇔ vi ≥ vj are used. Examples of impervious divisor methods are the methods due to Huntington and Hill, Adams, and Dean [see Balinski and Young, 1982 The Sainte-Laguë method was first adopted in 1842 for allocating seats in the United States House of Representatives, and currently it is used for parliamentary election in some countries (for instance Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, or Sweden) and for several state-level legislatures in Germany.
The following example illustrates the two methods defined above.
Example 1.
Consider the instance with four parties P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 and 100 voters such that 6, 7, 39, 48) , and assume that there are h = 10 seats to be allocated. 
.. with the sequences of denominators given by the respective divisor method (the ratios are rounded to two decimal places). The h = 10 largest numbers in this table are printed in bold and correspond to the seat allocation.
As we can see in the above example, different divisor methods might give different results for some instances of the apportionment problem. In particular, the D'Hondt method slightly favors large parties over small ones in comparison to the Sainte-Laguë method [Pukelsheim, 2014] .
Several other divisor methods such as the Huntington-Hill method (aka the method of equal proportions), the Adams method (aka method of smallest divisors), and the Dean method are studied in the literature on fair representation. We refer the reader to the books of Balinski and Young [1982] and Pukelsheim [2014] for an extensive overview.
The Largest Remainder Method
The largest remainder method is the most well-known apportionment method that is not a divisor method. Recall that v + = p i=1 v i denotes the total number of votes. 
Definition 4 (Largest remainder method

Properties of Apportionment Methods
The literature on fair representation has identified a number of desirable properties of apportionment methods [Balinski and Young, 1982, Pukelsheim, 2014] . In this paper, we focus on properties requiring that the proportion of seats in the resulting apportionment should reflect, as close as possible, the proportion of the votes cast for respective parties. 
Clearly, any apportionment method respecting quota also respects lower quota. It is well known that the largest remainder method respects quota, but no divisor method does. Moreover, the D'Hondt method is the only divisor method respecting lower quota [Balinski and Young, 1982] .
Approval-Based Multiwinner Election Rules
We now introduce the setting of approval-based multiwinner elections. We have a finite set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of voters and a finite set C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m } of candidates. Each voter expresses their preferences by approving a subset of candidates, and we want to select a committee consisting of exactly k candidates. We will refer to k-element subsets of C as size-k committees, and we let A i ⊆ C denote the set of candidates approved by voter i ∈ N . Formally, an instance of the approvalbased multiwinner election problem is given by a tuple (A, k), where A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) is a preference profile and k is the desired committee size. An approval-based multiwinner election rule (henceforth multiwinner rule) R is a function that maps every instance (A, k) to a nonempty set 3 R(A, k) of size-k committees. Every element of R(A, k) is referred to as a winning committee.
OWA-Based Rules
A remarkably general class of multiwinner election rules is defined via ordered weighted averaging (OWA) operators [Thiele, 1895 , Yager, 1988 , Skowron et al., 2015 . A weight sequence is an infinite sequence of real numbers w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . .). 4
Definition 6 (OWA-based rules). Consider a weight sequence w, a committee S ⊆ C, and a voter i ∈ N . The satisfaction of i from S given w is defined as u w i (S) =
w j . Given an instance (A, k) of the multiwinner election problem, the w-based OWA rule selects all size-k committees S that maximize the total satisfaction i∈N u w i (S).
Note that multiplying a weight sequence w by a positive constant does not change the way in which a rule operates. Several established multiwinner election rules can be described as OWAbased rules. 
.).
The Chamberlin-Courant rule is usually defined in the context of multiwinner elections where voter preferences are given by ranked ballots, and each voter derives satisfaction only from their most preferred member of the committee [Chamberlin and Courant, 1983] . Our definition of the rule is a straightforward adaption to the approval setting: a voter is satisfied with a committee if and only if it contains at least one candidate that the voter approves of. 
Though sometimes attributed to Forest Simmons, PAV was already proposed and discussed by the Danish polymath Thorvald N. Thiele in the 19th century [Thiele, 1895] . 5 According to PAV, each voter cares about the whole committee, but the marginal gain of satisfaction of an already satisfied voter from an additional approved committee member is lower than the gain of a less satisfied voter. The reason for using the particular weight sequence w PAV is not obvious. Aziz et al. [2015] and Sánchez-Fernández et al. [2016] provide compelling arguments by showing that w PAV is the unique weight sequence w such that the w-based OWA rule satisfies certain axiomatic properties. Theorem 2 in the present paper can be viewed as an additional-though related-argument in favor of the weight sequence w PAV .
Definition 9. The top-k rule is the OWA-based rule with weight sequence w top-k = (1, 1, 1, . . .).
According to the top-k rule, the winning committee contains the k candidates that have been approved by the greatest number of voters.
The following example illustrates the OWA-based rules defined above.
Example 3. Let k = 3 and consider the following preference profile with 12 voters: Other appealing OWA-based rules include the t-best OWA rule, which is defined by the weight sequence w = (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0 . . .) with t ones followed by zeros, and the t-median OWA rule, which is defined by the weight sequence w = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, 0, . . .), where the 1 appears at position t [Skowron et al., 2015] .
Sequential OWA-Based Rules
Another interesting class of multiwinner election systems consists of sequential (or iterative) variants of OWA-based rules.
Definition 10. The sequential w-based OWA rule selects all committees that can result from the following procedure. Starting with the empty committee (S = ∅), in k consecutive steps add to the committee S a candidate c that maximizes i∈N u i (S ∪ {c}) − u i (S).
Just like OWA-based rules, sequential OWA-based rules have already been considered by Thiele [1895] . Sequential Proportional Approval Voting (referred to as "reweighted approval voting" by Aziz et al. [2015] ) was used for a short period in Sweden during the early 1900s [Janson, 2016] .
Interestingly, a sequential OWA-based rule approximates the original rule whenever the weight sequence w is non-increasing [Skowron et al., 2015] . Sequential OWA-based rules are appealing alternatives to their original equivalents for a number of reasons. First, they are computationally tractable, while finding winners for the original OWA-based rules is often NP-hard. Second, the sequential rules often exhibit properties which the original rules do not have; for instance, they (trivially) satisfy committee monotonicity while some of the original versions do not [see, e.g., Elkind et al., 2014] . Third, sequential methods are easier to describe to non-experts, as compared to rules formulated as non-trivial combinatorial optimization problems. 
Monroe's Rule
The optimization problem underlying the Chamberlin-Courant rule can be thought of in terms of maximizing representation: every voter is assigned to a single candidate in the committee and this "representative" completely determines the satisfaction that the voter derives from the committee. The rule proposed by Monroe [1995] is based on the same idea; However, Monroe requires each candidate to represent the same number of voters. For the sake of simplicity, when considering the Monroe rule we assume that the number of voters n is divisible by the size of the committee k.
Definition 11. Assume that k divides n and consider a size-k committee S. A balanced allocation of the voters to the candidates S is a function τ
The satisfaction u i (τ S ) of a voter i from τ S is equal to one if i approves of τ S (i), and zero otherwise. The total satisfaction of voters provided by S, denoted u(S), is defined as the satisfaction from the best balanced allocation, i.e., u(S) = max τ S i∈N u i (τ S ). The Monroe rule selects all committees S maximizing u(S).
Example 5. Consider the instance from Example 3 and consider committee {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }, which is a winning committee under the Chamberlin-Courant rule. Even though every voter has an approved committee member (voters 1-7 approve of c 1 , voters 8 and 9 approve of c 2 , and voters 10-12 approve of c 3 ), this committee has a total satisfaction of 10 only. This is because the function τ {c 1 ,c 2 ,c 3 } , defined as 
Phragmén's Rules
In the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragmén proposed several methods for selecting committees based on approval votes [Phragmén, 1894 [Phragmén, , 1895 [Phragmén, , 1896 . Here, we formulate two particularly interesting variants [see Brill et al., 2017] . The motivation behind Phragmén's rules is to find a committee whose "support" is distributed as evenly as possible among the electorate. For every candidate in the committee, one unit of "load" needs to be distributed among the voters approving this candidate. The goal is to find a committee of size k for which the maximal load of a voter (or the variance of load distribution) is as small as possible.
Definition 12. Consider an instance
The multiwinner election rules max-Phragmén and var-Phragmén are defined as optimization problems over the set of all load distributions. Figure 1 : Illustration of Example 6. The diagram on the left illustrates a load distribution minimizing the maximal voter load max i∈N c∈C ℓ i,c , and the diagram on the right illustrates the unique load distribution minimizing the variance i∈N ( c∈C ℓ i,c ) 2 .
Example 6. Let k = 3 and consider the following preference profile with 5 voters: 
Apportionment Via Multiwinner Election Rules
In this section we demonstrate how approval-based multiwinner rules can be employed as apportionment methods. For a given instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem, this procedure involves three steps:
1. Translate (v, h) into an instance (A, k) of the multiwinner problem.
2. Apply the multiwinner rule R to (A, k).
Translate committee(s) in
We now describe each step in detail.
Step 1. Given an instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem, we construct an instance (A, k) of the multiwinner problem as follows. For each i ∈ [p], we introduce a set C i consisting of h candidates, and a set N i consisting of v i voters. Each voter in N i approves of all candidates in C i (and of no other candidates). Furthermore, we define
Intuitively, C i is the set of members of party P i and N i is the set of voters who voted for party P i .
Step 2. We can now apply multiwinner rule R to (A, k) in order to find the set R(A, k) of winning committees.
Step 3. For every winning committee S ∈ R(A, k), we can extract a seat distribution x for the instance (v, h) in the following way: the number x i of seats of a party P i is given by the number of candidates from C i in the committee S, i.e., x i = |C i ∩ S|.
The next example illustrates this three-step procedure.
Example 7 (Sequential PAV as an apportionment method). Consider the instance (v, h) = ((20, 40, 30, 10) 
Thus, the corresponding seat allocation is (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) = (2, 4, 3, 1).
For a given multiwinner rule R, we let M R denote the apportionment method defined by steps 1 to 3. We say that a multiwinner election rule R satisfies (lower) quota if the corresponding apportionment method M R satisfies the respective property.
OWA-Based Apportionment Methods
In this section, we consider apportionment methods induced by OWA-based rules. Fix a weight sequence w and let R denote the w-based OWA rule. For every instance (v, h) of the apportionment setting, M R (v, h) contains all seat distributions x maximizing the total voter satisfaction u(x), which is given by
Here, u w i (x) = x i j=1 w j denotes the satisfaction of a voter from party P i . We letû(i, s) denote the marginal increase in u(·) when assigning the s-th seat to party P i . Due to (1), we haveû(i, s) = v i w s . Taking away a seat from party P i and giving it to party P j results in a change of total voter satisfaction of
Whenever the weight vector w is non-increasing, the w-based OWA rule induces the same apportionment method as its sequential variant. 6 Proposition 1. Let w be a weight sequence with w j ≥ w j+1 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N. The apportionment method induced by the w-based OWA rule coincides with the apportionment method induced by the sequential w-based OWA rule.
Proof. Fix a weight sequence w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . .) satisfying w j ≥ w j+1 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N. Let R be the w-based OWA rule and let R ′ be the sequential w-based OWA rule. We show that the apportionment methods induced by R and R ′ coincide, i.e., M R ′ = M R .
Consider an instance (v, h) of the apportionment setting. Then M R (v, h) contains all seat distributions x maximizing the total voter satisfaction u(x), which is given by (1). Now consider the apportionment method M R ′ based on the sequential w-based OWA rule. This method starts with the empty seat allocation x (0) = (0, . . . , 0) and iteratively assigns a seat to a party P i such that the marginal increase in total voter satisfaction is maximized. Recall that u(i, s) denotes the marginal increase in u(·) when assigning the s-th seat to party P i . Due to (1), this quantity is independent of x j for j = i and equalsû(i, s) = v i w s . For ℓ = 1, . . . , h, method M R ′ iteratively chooses a party P i * with i * ∈ arg max i∈[p]û (i,
For every seat allocation x, the total voter satisfaction u(x) can be written as u(x) = i∈ [p] x i s=1û (i, s). In particular, u(x) is independent of the order in which seats are allocated to parties. Furthermore, our assumption w 1 ≥ w 2 ≥ . . . implies that the marginal satisfactionû(i, s) is monotonically decreasing in s for every party P i . Therefore, any seat distribution maximizing u(·) (i.e., any x ∈ M R (v, h)) can be iteratively constructed by applying method M R ′ .
An immediate corollary is that OWA-based rules with a monotonically decreasing weight sequence can be computed efficiently in the apportionment setting.
Further, we can use Proposition 1 to show that every OWA-based rule with a non-increasing weight sequence induces a divisor method. 
.).
Proof. Fix a weight sequence w with w j ≥ w j+1 > 0 for all j ∈ N. Let R(w) denote the w-based OWA rule, and let R ′ (w) denote the sequential w-based OWA rule. It follows from Proposition 1 that M R(w) coincides with M R ′ (w) . Let furthermore M (d w ) denote the divisor method based on d w . We are going to show that M R ′ (w) coincides with M (d w ).
Both M (d w ) and M R ′ (w) work iteratively. At each iteration, M (d w ) assigns a seat to a party P i maximizing
, where v i is the number of votes for party P i and s i is the number of seats allocated to party P i in previous iterations. Method M R ′ (w) , on the other hand, assigns a seat to a party maximizing the marginal increase in total voter satisfaction. The marginal increase in total voter satisfaction when giving an additional seat to party P i equalsû(i,
, we can observe that the quantities (
exactly coincide with the quantities (v i w s i +1 ) i∈ [p] used in the method M R ′ (w) . Thus, both methods assign seats in exactly the same way.
Proportional Approval Voting as an Extension of the D'Hondt Method
A particularly interesting consequence of Theorem 1 is that Proportional Approval Voting, the OWA rule with w PAV = (1, 
Corollary 2. The apportionment method induced by PAV coincides with the D'Hondt method.
The observation that PAV reduces to the D'Hondt method in the party-list setting occasionally occurs (without proof) in the literature [e.g., see Pereira, 2016] . 7 Theorem 1 shows that this is just one special case of the general relationship between OWA-based multiwinner rules and divisor methods.
Since the D'Hondt method satisfies lower quota, the same holds for PAV (and Sequential PAV) in the apportionment setting.
Corollary 3. PAV and Sequential PAV satisfy lower quota.
The fact that PAV satisfies lower quota can also be established by observing that every multiwinner rule satisfying extended justified representation [Aziz et al., 2015] or proportional justified representation [Sánchez-Fernández et al., 2016 ] also satisfies lower quota. See Appendix A for details.
Further, we show that PAV is the only OWA-based rule satisfying lower quota. 8
Theorem 2. PAV is the only OWA-based rule satisfying lower quota.
Proof. Let R be an OWA-based rule such that M R satisfies lower quota. We will show that R is based on a weight sequence w with w j = w 1 j for all j ∈ N, from which we will infer that M R is equivalent to PAV.
Fix j ∈ N. We will show w j = w 1 j in two steps.
Step 1. Given a natural number Z > 1, we define an instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem as follows. There are Z +1 parties and the vote distribution is given by v = (Z, jZ −1, . . . , jZ −1). That is, party P 1 gets Z votes and all other parties get jZ − 1 votes. Thus, the total number of votes
Thus, P 1 is allocated at least one seat, and each of the other Z parties is allocated at least j − 1 seats. From the pigeonhole 7 In fact, already Thiele [1895] stated this equivalence, but only in the special case when perfect proportionality is possible; see the survey by Janson [2016] .
8 This result also follows from Theorem 1 together with the characterization of the D'Hondt method as the only divisor method satisfying lower quota [Balinski and Young, 1982, Proposition 6.4 ]. We give a direct proof for completeness.
principle we infer that at least one of the parties P 2 , . . . , P Z+1 gets exactly j − 1 seats. Let P ℓ be such a party and consider the seat allocation x 1 ℓ . Since x maximizes u(·), we have
It follows that w j ≤ w 1 j · Z Z−1 . Since this inequality has to hold for all natural numbers Z > 1, we infer that w j ≤ w 1 j .
Step 2. Next, we construct another instance (v ′ , h ′ ) of the apportionment problem, again parameterized by a natural number Z > 1. There are Z + 1 parties and the vote distribution is v ′ is given by v ′ = (jZ, Z − 1, . . . , Z − 1). Thus, v ′ + = Z 2 − Z + jZ. The number of seats is given by
Since M R satisfies lower quota, we infer that
Z(Z+j−1) = j. The pigeonhole principle implies that at least one of parties P 2 , . . . , P Z+1 gets no seat. Let P ℓ be such a party and consider x 1 ℓ . We have
and thus w j ≥ We have therefore shown that w j = w 1 j for all j ∈ N. It follows that w = c · w PAV for some constant c > 0. As a consequence, R is equivalent to PAV.
Theorem 2 characterizes PAV as the only OWA-based rule respecting lower quota. Since PAV does not respect (exact) quota, it follows that no OWA-based rule respects quota. Due to Proposition 1, the same is true for sequential OWA-based rules.
The load-balancing rule max-Phragmén also induces the D'Hondt method. Indeed, Phragmén formulated his rule as a generalization of the D'Hondt method to the general ("open list") case (see Janson, 2016) .
Theorem 3. The apportionment method induced by max-Phragmén coincides with the D'Hondt method.
Proof. In the apportionment setting, optimal load distributions have a very simple structure. Given a seat distribution x, it is clearly optimal to distribute the load of x i (1 for each seat that is allocated to party P i ) uniformly among the v i voters of the party. Therefore, the maximal voter load for x is given by max i∈ [p] x i v i . Balinski and Young have shown that the D'Hondt method selects seat distributions minimizing this quantity [Balinski and Young, 1982, Proposition 3.10] .
We note that Phragmén also proposed a sequential rule based on load distributions. It is straightforward to verify that, in the apportionment setting, this variant coincides with max-Phragmén and thus also induces the D'Hondt method.
Monroe's Rule as an Extension of the Largest Remainder Method
We now turn to Monroe's multiwinner rule. It turns out that it induces the largest remainder method. Proof. Let R denote Monroe's rule. Recall that Monroe's rule assigns voters to candidates in a balanced way, so as to maximize the total voter satisfaction. In the apportionment setting, a voter in N i is satisfied if and only if she is assigned to a candidate in C i . The apportionment method M R selects seat distributions maximizing the total voter satisfaction.
For a seat allocation x, let u(x) denote the total voter satisfaction provided by x. We can write u(x) = i∈[p] u(i, x), where u(i, x) is the total satisfaction that voters in N i derive from x. For a given instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem, u(i, x) can be expressed as
We show that M R coincides with the largest remainder method for all instances (v, h) such that v + divides h. Fix such an instance (v, h) and let x ∈ M R (v, h). The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. We first show that x i ≥ ⌊ v i h v + ⌋ for all parties P i . Assume for contradiction that this is not the case and let P i be a party with
− 1 and, by the pigeonhole principle, that there exists a party P j such that
Step 2. We next show that
⌋ for all parties P i . Assume for contradiction that this is not the case and let P i be a party with
Similarly as before, we infer that x i ≥ v i h v + + 1 and that there exists a party P j with x j <
As in step 1, we have reached a contradiction.
Step 3. In the first two steps, we have shown that ⌊
⌉ for each party P ℓ . Now we show that M R coincides with the largest remainder method. For the sake of contradiction, assume that this is not the case. Then, there exist two parties P i and P j such that
Therefore,
where the inequality is due to (3). We again obtain a contradiction, completing the proof.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 4 is that Monroe's rule respects quota.
Phragmén's Variance-Minimizing Rule as an Extension of the Sainte-Laguë method
We now turn to the Sainte-Laguë method. Since the Sainte-Laguë method is the divisor method based on (1, 3, 5, . . .), Theorem 1 implies that it is induced by the w-based OWA rule with weight sequence (1, 1 /3, 1 /5, . . .). 9 However, this is not the only multiwinner rule inducing the SainteLaguë method. Recall that var-Phragmén is the variant of Phragmén's load-balancing methods that minimizes the variance of the loads.
Theorem 5. The apportionment method induced by var-Phragmén coincides with the Sainte-Laguë method.
Proof. Sainte-Laguë [1910] and Owens [1921] have shown that the Sainte-Laguë method selects exactly those seat distributions x minimizing
[see also Balinski and Young, 1982, pages 103-104] . By ignoring constants, one can see that minimizing e(x) is equivalent to minimizing i∈[p]
. The multiwinner rule var-Phragmén chooses a committee corresponding to a load distribution L minimizing j∈N ( c∈C ℓ j,c ) 2 . For a given seat distribution x, we can without loss of generality assume that the load of x i is distributed equally among all v i voters in N i . Thus, the total load assigned to a voter j ∈ N i equals c∈C ℓ j,c =
It follows that both methods solve the identical minimization problem, and thus coincide.
Other Multiwinner Rules in the Context of Apportionment
In this section we examine two further OWA-based rules, the Chamberlin-Courant rule and the topk rule, in the context of apportionment. Since w CC = (1, 0, 0, . . .) and w top-k = (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, . . .), Proposition 1 applies to both rules. The Chamberlin-Courant apportionment method produces lots of ties, because it does not strive to give more than one seat even to parties with a large support. In the special case where the number p of parties exceeds the number h of seats, the Chamberlin-Courant rules assigns one seat to each of the h largest parties. 10 Proposition 4 gives an interesting insight into the nature of the Chamberlin-Courant apportionment method: it selects an assembly having one representative from each of the h largest groups of a given society.
The top-k rule is on the other end of the spectrum of apportionment methods.
Proposition 5. The apportionment method induced by the top-k rule assigns all seats to the party (or parties) receiving the highest number of votes.
Thus, the top-k rule induces the apportionment method M * in Proposition 4.5 of Balinski and Young [1982] . This apportionment method is often used to select (minority) governments. A minority cabinet is usually formed by the party that receives the greatest number of votes, even if it does not have a majority of the seats.
We conclude this section by mentioning two further rules that are often studied in the context of multiwinner elections. Satisfaction approval voting [Brams and Kilgour, 2014] induces the same apportionment methods as the top-k rule. And minimax approval voting [Brams et al., 2007] induces the apportionment method that assigns the seats in a way that maximizes the number of seats of the party with the fewest seats. In particular, if there are more parties than seats, then all committees are winning.
Degressive Proportionality and Election Thresholds
In this section, we show that OWA-based multiwinner rules can also be used to induce apportionment methods with appealing properties other than lower quota. We do this by exploring degressive proportionality, the concept suggesting that smaller populations should be allocated more representatives in comparison to the quota-based allocation methods, and election thresholds, the concept saying that a party should only be represented in parliament if it receives at least a certain fraction of votes. To the best of our knowledge, the OWA-based rules considered in this section have not been studied before.
Degressive Proportionality
Despite its mathematical elegance and apparent simplicity, the proportionality principle is not always desirable. For instance, in an assembly where decisions are taken under simple majority rule, a cohesive group of 51% has obviously more than a "fair" share. Principles of justice indicate that, for decisions bodies governed by majority rule, fair apportionment should follow a norm of degressive proportionality [Laslier, 2012 , Koriyama et al., 2013 . In fact, degressive proportional apportionments can often be observed in parliaments that gather districts, regions, or states of very different sizes, such as the European Parliament. 11 We now provide two examples, both of which are OWA-based.
The Penrose apportionment method (aka square-root method and devised by Penrose [1946] ; see also the work of Slomczynski andŻyczkowski [2006] ) allocates seats in such a way that the number of seats allocated to a party is proportional to the square root of the votes for that party. It has been proposed for the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly [International Network for a UN Second Assembly, 1987] and for allocating voting weights 12 in the Council of the European Union [BBC News, 2004] .
Let us say that an apportionment method M satisfies the Penrose condition if, for every instance (v, h) and for every x ∈ M (v, h), it holds that x i ≥ ⌊h
. Interestingly, the Penrose condition can be satisfied by using an OWA-based rule. The weight sequence w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . .) achieving this is given by w j = 1 j 2 for all j ∈ N. Theorem 6. The apportionment method induced by the OWA-based rule with weight sequence w = (1, 1 /4, 1 /9, . . .) satisfies the Penrose condition.
Proof. Let R be the w-based OWA rule with w j = 1 j 2 for all j ∈ N. We show that M R satisfies the Penrose condition. Assume for contradiction that for some instance (v, h) of the apportionment 11 Even though the composition of the European Parliament is not the result of the application of a well-defined rule, it is interesting to note that the history of successive negotiations produced such a result [see Rose, 2013] . 12 The question of allocating voting weights to representatives is formally equivalent to the apportionment problem.
problem, there is a seat distribution x ∈ M R (v, h) with x i < ⌊h
− 1, and, using the pigeonhole principle, that there exists a party P j such that
We conclude that
, and thus
contradicting the assumption that x ∈ M R (v, h). This completes the proof.
Degressive proportionality is also an important feature of the so-called Cambridge Compromise, which proposes an apportionment method for the European Parliament based on an affine formula: each member state should be endowed with a fixed number (5) of delegates plus a variable number, proportional to the population of the state [Grimmett et al., 2011] .
We show that such an apportionment method can be implemented via an OWA-based multiwinner rule.
Proposition 6. Consider an instance (v, h) of the apportionment setting with h ≥ 5p and let Z be a constant with Z > 5v + . Let R denote the w-based OWA rule with weight sequence w = (0, 0, 0, 0, Z, 1, 1 /2, 1 /3, . . .). Then, for every x ∈ M R (v, h) and for every i ∈ [p],
Proof. We first prove that each party gets at least five seats. Indeed, for the sake of contradiction let us assume that party P i gets less than five seats. By transferring some votes from other parties (having more than five representatives) to P i we increase the satisfaction of supporters of P i by at least v i Z > 5v + . At the same time, transferring a seat from some party P j (having more than five seats) to P i reduces the satisfaction of the supporters of P j by at most v + . Thus, such a transfer of at most five seats improves the total satisfaction of the voters, a contradiction. We now show that
. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is an instance (v, h) of the apportionment problem and a seat distribution x ∈ M R (v, h) with
and, by the pigeonhole principle, there exists a party P j such that
Consequently,
Election Thresholds
OWA-based multiwinner rules also provide an interesting way for implementing election thresholds. Proof. Consider a seat distribution x ∈ M R (v, h). First, observe that there is at least one party that is allocated strictly more than t seats. (Otherwise, the total voter satisfaction u(x) would be zero and could be improved upon by giving all seats to an arbitrary party.) Without loss of generality let us assume that party P 1 is such a party, i.e., x 1 > t. Second, observe that every party that is allocated some seat under x, is allocated strictly more than t seats. In other word, x ℓ > 0 implies x ℓ > t. (Otherwise, the total voter satisfaction provided by x could be improved upon by x ℓ 1 .) Now consider a party P i with x i > 0. The argument above implies that x i > t. Let v x + denote the total number of votes for parties with allocated seats under x, i.e., v x + = ℓ∈[p]:x ℓ >0 v ℓ . If
h > t h and we are done. So let us assume that
. From the pigeonhole principle we infer that there exists a party P j with x j > 0 such that
h . Since x j > 0, the observation above implies that x j > t. Therefore, 0 ≥ u(x i j ) − u(x) =û(j, x j + 1) −û(i,
and thus
This completes the proof.
An interesting open question is whether it is possible to naturally modify the definition of the Monroe system to implement election thresholds.
Conclusion
In legislative procedures, proportional representation is typically achieved by employing party-list apportionment methods such as the D'Hondt method or the largest remainder method. These methods impose proportionality by assuring that each party in a representative body is allocated a number of representatives that is proportional to the number of received votes.
In this paper we have proposed a simple and natural formal framework that allows us to view approval-based multiwinner election rules as apportionment methods. This framework has enabled us to establish correspondences between several multiwinner rules, such as PAV, the Monroe rule, the top-k rule, and the Chamberlin-Courant rule, and the corresponding apportionment methods. These results give interesting insights into the nature of the analyzed multiwinner rules, and they show how traditional apportionment methods can be extended to settings where voters can vote for individual candidates.
A Proportional Justified Representation Implies Lower Quota
In this section, we prove that the every multiwinner rule satisfying proportional justified representation induces an apportionment method satisfying quota. The following definition is due to Sánchez-Fernández et al. [2016] . h and | i∈N * A i | = |C i | = h ≥ ℓ, proportional justified representation implies that every committee S that is chosen by R satisfies |S ∩ ( i∈N * A i )| ≥ ℓ. And since S ∩ ( i∈N * A i ) = S ∩ C i , we know that x i = |S ∩ C i | ≥ ℓ. Thus, party P i is allocated at least ℓ = ⌊ v i h v + ⌋ seats, as desired.
Since Proportional Approval Voting satisfies PJR-and in fact even the stronger property extended justified representation [Aziz et al., 2015] -it also satisfies lower quota.
